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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD R . BLACK, D.D.S. and
PATRICIA ]BLACK,
Plaintiffs> and Appellants,

)
)
Case No. 14358

VS.

DR. JAMES S. BOYCE,
Defendant and Respondent.

)

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for damages brought by the buyers
of corporate stock against the seller for an illegal sale of
the stock which was the subject matter of the buyers1 conditional sales agreement contrary to the provisions in the Uniform
Commercial Code.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court. From a verdict for
the defendant of no cause of action the plaintiffs appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants seek to have the judgment of the
Trial Court reversed and a new trial granted to determine
plaintiffs1 damages from the wrongful sale of the purchased
stock.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In August, 1961, the plaintiffs and the defendant, together with one, Doctor E. Wayne Allred, purchased
a property fronting on State Street in Orem, Utah.

The

property had formerly been a motel and had an approximate
size of three and one-half acres.

(Tr. 4) After acquisi-

tion the owners of the property incorporated under the
name of Orem Professional Plaza, Inc.
sharps

and issued 90

£ stock, 30 shares to each of them.

jLMiies 7-11)

(Tr. 6

They then transferred all of the property to

the corporation.

(Tr. 14 lines 2-9)

Each of the three

owners established their professional offices in separate
suites in the former motel property.

In 1963 the defend-

ant moved his dental practice to the State of California
(Tr. 6 lines 25-27) and in 1964 negotiated to sell plaintiffs his 30 shares of stock in Orem Professional Plaza,
Inc.

(Tr. 6 lines 28-30)

On June 4, 1964, the defendant

forwarded a letter consummating the transaction (ex. 4)
and a letter of resignation (Ex. 5) as officer and director of the corporation.

(Tr. 7 lines 20-25)

No formal

agreement was prepared for the stock purchase, but the
plaintiffs executed a promissory note for $3,343.20 (Ex.
2) (Tr. 8 lines 4-9 and Tr. 8 lines 25-30)

The defendant,

seller of the stock, retained possession of the stock

-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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certificates, the parties agreeing by their testimony that the
stock was to be transferred upon completion of payment.
64 lines 3-7 and 23-30)

(Tr.

The plaintiffs made irregular payments

to the defendant on the promissory note through May 13, 1967.
(Ex. 7) (Tr. 9 lines 3-7)

In 1964 four payments were made, in

1965 two payments, two in 1966, and in 1967 three, all of
different and varying amounts.

(Ex. 7)

By February 28, 1967

plaintiffs had made advance payments of $102.02, more than
required by the terms of the promissory note.
1967, they were $45.46 paid in advance.

By May 13,

By July 7, 1967,

according to the terms of the promissory note they were $65.98
in arrears.

On July 7, 1967, the defendant claimed to have

sent a letter to the Plaintiff, Richard R. Black, but not
addressed to the Plaintiff, Patricia Black, the other purchaser
(Ex. 8) (Tr. 17 lines 2630, Tr. 18 lines 19-29) The letter was
never received by the plaintiffs.

(Tr. 29 lines 16-21) There-

after, on December 6, 1967, the defendant received a letter
from the plaintiffs (Ex.

6) together with a check for two

installments in the sum of $111.76.
10 lines 2-7)

(Tr. 9 lines 24-30, Tr.

The letter informed the defendant that the

plaintiffs would pay two payments monthly and had sold other
property by which they would soon be able to pay the balance
owing upon the note.

The defendant did not respond to the

letter but banked the payments received with the letter.

On

August 7, 1967, prior to the receipt of the two installments
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and the letter of December 6, 1967, the defendant sold
the 30 shares of stock to the other stockholders of Orem
Professional Plaza for the then remaining unpaid balance
upon the promissory note.

(Tr. 13 lines 17-21)

No

further notice of any kind was given to the plaintiffs.
No notification was given to the plaintiffs after the
receipt of the two installments and the letter of
December 6, 1967 which informed the plaintiffs of the
prior sale of the stock to the other owners of the
Orem Professional Plaza, Inc.

(Tr. 67 lines 1-10)

After the letter of December 6, 196 7 from the plaintiffs
to the defendant no further communication transferred
between them.

Thereafter, the other owners of Orem

Professional Plaza made a demand for rentals and
eventually evicted the plaintiffs from the Professional
Offices.

(Ex. 9)
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING ON THE
ADMISSION OF EXHIBIT 8 NOTICE LETTER ALLEGEDLY
SENT BY THE DEFENDANT TO THE PLAINTIFF RICHARD
BLACK
In keeping with Campbell v. Gowans & Milner,
(1909), 35 Utah 268, 100 Pac. 397, the trial court should
have ruled that the presumption of delivery of Exhibit 8
was overcome by the testimony of Plaintiff Richard

-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Black.

(Tr. 29 lines 16-21)

There is no evidence or

testimony that the Plaintiff Patricia Black was ever
sent any notice of intention to sell the stock.

The

Exhibit 8 was allegedly sent to the Plaintiff Richard
Black at his place of business not at the residence.
(Tr. 18 Lines 19-27)

Defendant's brief states as proof

that Plaintiff Richard Black received the letter (Ex. 8)
notifying the plaintiffs that the stock would be
sold, the fact that if the plaintiffs did not receive the
letter, why would plaintiffs call the defendant to ask if
defendant still had the stock.

That question is answered

by the Plaintiff Richard Black's testimony (Tr. 25 lines
9-21; Tr. 29 lines 22-28) wherein he stated that he had
received an eviction notice from the premises on
November 30 and called the defendant to find out why
he was being evicted from property he was ostensibly
purchasing.

In that conversation, the defendant indicated

to the plaintiff that he still had the stock.

Thereupon

the plaintiff wrote the letter (Ex. 6) acknowledged by the
defendant as having been received on December 6 with
two payments upon the promissory note.

It is inconceiv-

able to believe that the plaintiff would have sent payments
to the defendant with the letter (Ex. 6) if, as claimed
by the defendant, in the month previous to such payments
Molly Allred had informed the plaintiff that she had the
-5-
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stock and that plaintiff could redeem it from her,
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING ON THE
REMEDIES OF THE UNPAID SELLER BOTH UNDER
THE PRESENT LAW AND THE FORMER LAW RELATIVE
TO NOTICE OF DEFAULT AND RESCISSION
Defendant's brief suggests that because Title
70A was not effective until December 31, 1965, and that
therefore the question raised by plaintiffs in their
brief as to their rights to return of funds upon rescission
is not well taken.

Prior to the enactment of the Uniform

Commercial Code in Utah, the applicable law in Utah was
the Uniform Sales Act, Title 60, Utah Code Annotated.
Because this was an oral agreement for the sale of stock
and because other than the promissory note there was
no written agreement setting out the terms of the sale,
it is difficult to determine whether this transaction
was a sale or a contract.

This Court had ruled on the

matter of the passage of title under Section 60-1-1 in
Middletown v. Evans, (1953), 86 Utah 396, 45 P.2d 570,
where the court said at page 572:
. . .In a contract to sell, the parties
agreed to transfer the property in the
goods at some future time, whereas in
the sale the parties agreed to transfer
the property presently.
Whether the sale of stock by defendant to plaintiffs
would appear from the Middletown case to constitute
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i..

case the buyer should default, then it must be shown
that the buyer has been in default on the payment of
the price an unreasonable time before the seller may
resell the goods.

In the case before the Court, certainly

the goods are not perishable in nature and the seller
had not expressly reserved the right of resale in case
the buyer should default, but only that the buyer was
not to receive the possession of the stock until it was
paid.

Therefore, the responsibility of seller is to

establish that the buyer had been in default an unreasonable time or provide adequate notice.

Subparagraph (3)

of Section 60-4-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
bears further in this matter, pointing out that although
the validity of resale is not determined by notice given
to the original buyer, it does provide that where the
resale is not based on perishable nature of the goods
or an express provision giving right of resale of the
goods:
. . . The giving or failure to give such
notice shall be relevant in any issue
involving the question whether the
buyer had been in default an unreasonable
time before the resale was made.
Section 60-4-9(3), Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended.
Thus by code section the right of resale without notice
would have to be predicated upon the buyer having been
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which would have been required on a rescission of the
contract.

Section 6-4-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as

amended, further spells out that the seller may have a
right to rescind "where the buyer has been in default in
payment of the price."

But under that section in order

to rescind the section provides:
The transfer of title shall not be held
to have been rescinded by an unpaid seller
until he has manifested by notice to the
buyer, or by some other overt act, an
intention to rescind . . . [emphasis
supplied] Section 60-4-10(2), Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended.
Although the section provides that it is not necessary
that the overt act be communicated to the buyer:
• • • The giving or failure to give notice
to the buyer of the intention to rescind
shall be relevant in any issue involving
the question whether the buyer had been
in default an unreasonable time before the
right of rescission was asserted.""Section
60-4-10(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended.
Thus the statutes and the case law make it
apparent that the rules pertaining to rescission or of
selling the goods after default and the rights of the
buyer in the property were not substantially different
under the former Uniform Sales Act than under the Uniform
Commercial Code now in force.
If the seller elects to rescind, notice, which
is not only sent to but received by the buyer, would be

-10-
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a forfeiture of the plaintiffs' rights in the matter.
As cited in Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606, decided
by this Court February 18, 1976, as the correct statement

of the law for the S t a t e of Utah:
. . . When a seller accepts late payments
which allow a buyer to believe the forfeiture
provision will not be strictly enforced,
the court will not enforce it unless notice
is given and a reasonable time allowed to
make the delinquencies; and that where the
forfeiture of the amount that has been paid
in would be so inequitable as to be unconscionable the court of equity will refuse to
enforce it. Malmberg v. Baugh, (1923),
62 Utah 331, 508 P. 975; Lamont v. Evjen,
(1973), 29 Utah 2d 266, 508 P.2d 532;
Paul v. Kitt, 544 P.2d 886 (Utah December
1975) Id. at 609
Yet the failure to acknowledge the plaintiffs' right to
damages for the forfeiture imposed upon them is the
enforcement of an unconscionable forfeiture where there
has been no compliance with the rules of law regarding
rescission of sale.
POINT III
Plaintiffs' claim for recovery of damages
predicated upon the fact that defendant attempted to
rescind without complying with the

requirements of

rescission (not having made a valid rescission either
as to notice or as to return of consideration) should
have been granted.

Had the stock been sold for market

value, defendant could have returned plaintiffs' payments
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and completed a rescission, but in this case the defendant
did not sell for market value or the best price obtainable,
did not rescind, did not return the consideration and
restore the former status of the buyer and seller.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING ON THE
ALLEGED DEFAULT OF THE DEFENDANTS
Defendant contends that in November of 1967
Molly Allred, one of the subsequent buyers of the stock
which was to be purchased by the plaintiffs from the
defendant, spoke with Plaintiff Richard Balck and informed
him that she held his stock and he could redeem it.
Defendant further admits that on December 6, 1967 he
received the plaintiffs1 letter and two (2) installments
upon the note, some four (4) months after he had ostensibly
sold his stock to Molly Allred and the other purchasers.
(Tr. 9 lines 24-30; Tr. 10 lines 1-7; Tr. 29 lines 6-21)
It is inconceivable that the plaintiffs would have been
told by Molly Allred that she held their stock and they
could redeem it in adjoining offices to theirs in the
month of November, 1967, and then in December of 1967
that Plaintiff Richard Black would have a telephone
conversation with the defendant (Tr. 25 lines 9-20);
would have sent the letter (Ex. 6; Tr. 25 lines 20-23}
which was admittedly received by the defendant (Tr. 9
lines 24-30; Tr. 10 line 1), and the payments admittedly
received byDigitized
the bydefendant
10 J. line
2-7)
within
the Howard W. Hunter(Tr.
Law Library,
Reuben Clark
Law School,
BYU. a
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

month after the alleged discussion with Molly Allred
where she ostensibly told Plaintiff Richard Black that
she had the stock and he could redeem it from her for
the unpaid balance.

It is inconceivable that if such

a conversation took place that he would go to the extent
of the letter sent to the defendant and sending the
payments to California when they could have been paid in
adjoining offices in Orem, Utah-

Even if this Court

concludes that the trial court properly ruled that
plaintiffs were in default, plaintiffs were entitled to
a notice of rescission and to the return of the consideration unless the default had been such an unreasonable
length of time as to overcome the necessity of notice.
The requirement for rescission of return of consideration
cannot be disregarded but is an essential element of the
rescission.
CONCLUSION
In this case, the ruling by the trial court
deprived the plaintiffs of their rights under the former
law and under the present Uniform Commercial Code;
prevented plaintiffs from having the restoration of the
former status on rescission of the contract of sale or of
a damage award for the sale without compliance with said
requirements.

Under the agreement between plaintiffs and
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defendant, there are no specific provisions as to right
of resale of the stock; as to forfeiture, damages, transfer
of title and delivery of possession of the stock.

The

result would be unconscionable to deprive the plaintiffs/appellants all right in the stock or, in the alternative, to
the return of consideration.

The trial court erred in

ruling that the sale of the stock had been terminated
without compliance with either the former law on sale
after default or sale as provided under the Commercial
Code.

The judgment should be reversed with instructions

to enter an award for damages for resale of plaintiffs'
stock without complying with the statute in force.
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of May,
1976.
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